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ABSTRACT 
A decision team composed of managers and staff experts at Mary Kay Cosmetics devel­
ops packaging for new and revised products as well as sets their prices. However, the potential 
for costly errors in the decision-making process motivated this group to pursue development of 
an expert system (ES) to assist with the problem. The ES performed so well that it changed the 
organization's behavior—the group ceased to meet for the purpose of developing the packaging 
but instead gathered just to confirm and approve the expert system's solution. Despite the clear 
benefits associated with using an ES approach, the group stopped using the ES application and 
the behavior of the group returned to pre-ES practices. This work describes from a managerial 
perspective how and why this valuable tool fell into disuse, and offers valuable lessons for 
management. 
INTRODUCTION 
A decision team composed of managers and staff experts at Mary Kay Cosmetics develops 
packaging for new and revised products as well as sets their prices. However, errors in this 
decision-making process have costly results. For example, incompatibility between a cosmetic 
product and its container can cause product discoloration or failure of the package's integrity. 
Consequently, the group became interested in pursuing development of an expert system (ES) to 
help design error-free packaging. After construction, the ES performed so well that the group 
ceased to meet for purposes of making the decisions but instead assembled only to confirm and 
approve the expert system's solution. Despite the clear benefits associated with using this ES 
approach, the application fell into disuse and the behavior of the group returned to the pre-ES 
process. 
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This case study is important for several reasons. It is a rare example of using expert system 
technology in the product-packaging domain. It also documents a significant change in organiza­
tional behavior brought about from using a new information technology. Finally, it highlights 
both practices for success and issues that can cause failure when using a sophisticated informa­
tion technology such as expert systems. 
DOMAIN PROBLEM AND ES DEVELOPMENT 
Mary Kay Cosmetics decided to investigate an expert systems approach for selecting cos­
metic packages and setting product prices. The company explored an ES approach for both 
reasons of curiosity and a desire to reduce the likelihood of errors in the packaging decision 
process. 
The selection of packaging materials for cosmetic products poses a major challenge for the 
cosmetic industry. The selection criteria are based on marketing requirements and chemical com­
position of the product. Marketing requirements include type of dispenser and clarity of the 
package. The chemical requirements include the composition and characteristics of both the product 
and the package material. The challenge stems from reconciling these two different sets of re­
quirements given a set of cost constraints. 
The major sources of concern are product-package interaction (e.g., contamination of the 
product by the material of its package), product degradation over time (e.g., color change), or 
package failure (e.g., migration of the product through the package). Addressing these problems 
requires evaluation of varied decision factors such as alcohol content, solubility, oxygen or light 
sensitivity, fill temperature, pH, water vapor transmission rates, and the technical costs of manu­
facture. A packaging failure is expensive: product recall costs, costs associated with redesign and 
production of new packaging, lost sales, lost customer good will, and so forth (Amini, 1981). 
Prior to the use of the expert system, the packaging decision effort was a loosely structured 
process. A cross-functional work team representing marketing, product formulation, product 
safety, package engineering, research and development, purchasing, and manufacturing interests 
made the packaging decisions. No formal procedures existed for conducting the meetings, se­
quencing the decisions, or selecting package materials. The team members often relied on a 
heuristic process based on past experience, a frequent behavioral approach. Table 1 indicates the 
range of knowledge and informatio n used in the package development process. 
Under the old system technical and cost reasons encouraged the marketing team charged 
with developing the new product to give their requirements to the product formulator and the 
package design engineer at the same time. The requirement to start design work before knowing 
the ultimate product formulation often forced later package redesign. In addition, the marketing 
team often asked for designs which later proved beyond the allocated budget, or technically 
impossible, thus forcing another redesign. Also, with such an ad-hoc procedure the potential 
existed for marketing to favor a given package even though the produce design team believed it 
inappropriate. The result was a decision process that required numerous meetings over a period 
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of six or more weeks, and often saw earlier decisions questioned with subsequent restarts in 
product design. 
Table 1. Knowledge and Information Sources 
Used in Packaging Decision Process 
• Marketing requirements contained within the product specification 
• Knowledge of the chemical formulation used in the product 
• Knowledge of the performance of previous container types for similar product formulations 
• Results of compatibility tests on similar container types and similar product formulations 
• Vendor information 
• Cosmetic industry and packaging industry publications 
• Manufacturing process information 
• Shipping requirements (e.g., government regulations on hazardous material) 
It is from such an origin that the company's interest in an expert system solution emerged. 
This form of knowledge-based system (O'Keefe & Preece, 1996) applies a portion of the prob­
lem-solving expertise of one or more human experts in a given field to specific problems within 
that field. As such, expert systems can also be considered a subset of knowledge management 
systems (White, 1999). One of the strengths of ES technology is its ability to offer users explana­
tions of its reasoning process and recommendation:;. This educational feature was a major attrac-
tant for Mary Kay. 
The company had no prior experience with ES technology. However, one method for devel­
oping and applying a new information technology within a company is to associate with a univer­
sity partner. Development costs can be very reasonable, and the attendant risk minimal, as long 
as the project is well chosen. A number of expert system applications began life in this manner 
(Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998; Turban & Vedder, 1992). In this case, the cosmetics firm 
began a working relationship with the University of North Texas. In the first phase, graduate 
students built a prototype ES for the company as part of a class project (i.e., for free). In the 
second phase, the UNT Center for Quality and Productivity obtained a $11,000 grant from the 
company to support graduate students who built a second, production version of the ES. 
The completed application, built using a product from Neuron Data, had over 40 rules and 
consisted of a mathematics tool plus two ES components. The Solubility Calculator tool facili­
tated the calculation of the solubility factors for new products. These calculations are tedious and 
time consuming when performed without computer support. However, they are vital to the pro­
cess of selecting compatible packages. The first ES, the Package Material Selector (PMS), 
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recommended suitable package materials for a given cosmetic product, as well as any additional 
testing for package-product interactions. The second ES. the Product Cost Estimator (PCE). 
used the output of the PMS to guide users through the design of a new cosmetics package as well 
as help users determine the associated product cost. A more detailed description of this applica­
tion is provided by Popelka and Van Dyke (1993) and Van Dyke (1994). 
USAGE OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM 
After development, initial work with the ES began after appropriate training of Mary Kay 
staff on its operation. At first the director of package development installed the ES on a portable 
computer and brought it to the team meetings. He would operate the ES as the others provided 
input data or looked on. As often happens, using the ES structured the order of tasks and the 
group input (Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998; Yoon, Guimaraes, & O'Neal, 1995). Under the 
new system, marketing gave their product request to the formulator first. When the formula was 
perfected, the director of package development would gather the needed chemical data from the 
formulator and operate the ES in the presence of the entire development team. All team members 
received a printed copy of the Es's recommendations and appropriate justifications before leaving 
the meeting. 
The ES automated package/product compatibility, as well as some technical and cost fea­
sibility issues. This in turn greatly speeded the entire decision process, saving approximately 4 
weeks. There were no reported package design flaws associated with any of the products devel­
oped with the ES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT 
Using the ES provided the team with a clear sense of direction, agreed upon by all partici­
pants, earlier in the package decision process (Boeder, 1996). For example, the design of the ES 
allowed it to document the reasons behind a given recommendation. This Justification capability 
educated the group about design costs and other related issues. It became less likely that a team 
member would push a design that was too expensive or inappropriate. Thus the ES documenta­
tion made the initial package proposals more credible, and less vulnerable to redesign than in the 
past. 
By formulizing much of what had previously been considered intuitive, the ES improved 
understanding of the decision process itself (Berry, Berry, & Foster, 1998; Boeder, 1996; Motiwalla 
& Fairfield-Sonn, 1998). At the start of the ES development, one design team member believed 
that it would take approximately 500 rules to support the decision process. That person was 
amazed when the final number of mles proved less than a tenth of this estimate (Boeder, 1996). 
The consistency of the Es performance reassured ad members that they were unlikely to 
overlook a constraint or skip a step in the decision process. This in turn increased the team's 
confidence that the outcome would be accurate and reliable. In addition, the ES smoothed the 
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workload and all team members spent less time in meetings. Using the ES saved the company 
about 10-15% of the total time required for new product development, mainly by reducing false 
starts and package redesign (Berry, Berry. & Foster. 1998; Boeller. 1996; Martin. Subramanian. 
& Yaverbaum, 1996; Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998). 
Most importantly, the role played by the Fs in the decision process became far different 
than originally intended (Boeller, 1996; Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998). At the outset of the 
project, the FS was only to support the decisions made by the product development team. How­
ever, initial use by the team in its group meetings showed that the FS could in fact do much of the 
decision work on its own. Consequently, the group moved toward participating individually on an 
as-needed basis while the director of packaging design operated the FS and prepared the required 
documentation. The packaging team needed to meet as a group only to approve the recommenda­
tions of the FS. Thus the reliable performance of the expert system caused a significant change in 
organizational behavior that in turn allowed the application to have a far greater scope and 
authority than previously envisioned. 
REASONS FOR SUCCESS 
There are several reasons why this FS proved successful. First, there was a clear match 
between the abilities of the information technology and the nature of the problem. The packaging 
decision involved multiple sources of expertise, including the technical fields of chemistry and 
package engineering. The human experts used experiential (heuristic) knowledge as well as fac­
tual knowledge. The problem-solving process was procedural in nature, and thus was suitable for 
incorporation as a network of rules. All of these traits match well with developing an expert 
system solution (Waterman 1986; Wong & Monaco, 1995). 
Second, cost-benefit analysis favored using an expert system approach. By using graduate 
student labor, the application cost the company relatively little. Use of the FS greatly simplified 
the organization and sequencing of the package decision process, thus saving time (with fewer, 
shorter meetings) and effort (spent on debate, miscommunication, and redesigns). The develop­
ment effort itself clarified the decision process and made the outcome of that process more easily 
understood (Berry, Berry, & Foster, 1998; Boeller, 1996; Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998). 
Third, the project had a champion in the person of the director of package design, who 
believed in its worth and supported it continually with his personal involvement. An effective 
champion is an important factor in the success of an FS project (Berry, Berry,. & Foster, 1998; 
Duchessi & O'Keefe, 1992; Motiwala & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998). 
FAILURE OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM 
Despite these clear benefits, Mary Kay no longer uses the expert system. Instead, the orga­
nizational behavior associated with the package decision process has reverted to what took place 
before introduction of the FS. The reasons behind this paradox offer important lessons about 
pitfalls to avoid with a project involving new IT. 
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The immediate problem was that the company did not train anyone to maintain the ES. 
During the collaborative development phase company management expressed no interest in hav­
ing the university train one of its own employees in this new (for the company) information 
technology. After completion of the ES, Mary Kay did not continue its relationship with the 
university, nor did it continue any contact with Neuron Data. Consequently there was no one at 
the firm who knew how to use Neuron Data's software to maintain or enhance the ES. Further­
more, the entire project was conceived, developed, and utilized with little or no involvement by 
the firm's IT unit. There was no one within the IT unit whom the package design team could turn 
to for help (Dominski, 1996). Eventually, the package design team discovered that they needed to 
add new rules to the ES, but could not do so. This failure to evolve the ES in response to changing 
needs forced discontinuation of the tool. 
The deeper problem, however, was the absence of a continuing champion for the project. It 
was an immediate manager's decision, not the team's decision or that of higher management, to 
investigate and use an expert system approach. When the initial champion (the director of pack­
age design) left the firm, no one replaced him (Dominski, 1996). Without a champion, no one was 
willing to contribute the time, money, and other resources needed to maintain the ES, either 
internally or through the help of the university. No one in a position of authority was willing to 
sustain the project and, by his or her visible support, send a message about how important the 
project was to the firm's success. In short, managerial failures at Mary Kay doomed the project 
and kept a highly successful ES from being used in the long run (Duchessi & O'Keefe, 1992; Gill, 
1995; Motiwalla & Fairfield-Sonn, 1998; Yoon, Guimaraes, & O'Neal, 1995). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The experience of Mary Kay Cosmetics offers several important lessons for IT managers; 
• Demonstrable cost savings (in this case, time saved and no packaging errors) alone are 
insufficient to ensure the success of a new IT application. 
• The ability to reduce the friction within a group decision process alone is also insufficient. 
• Higher-level management has to be committed and involved on an on-going basis to ensure 
continuity. 
• Any new IT application must be integrated with the IT management policy of the firm so 
that it does not die if or when its champion leaves. 
• The organization's IT shop needs to be involved with any application development using 
new IT, because it will consume IT resources and probably need maintenance. The IT shop 
should understand deployed IT applications better than anyone else in the firm. 
• Perhaps most importantly, an IT application does not have to be large in size or terribly 
ambitious for it to impact significantly organizational behavior. All the application needs to 
do is meet an important organizational need in an effective, efficient, and acceptable man­
ner. In this age of constant technological change and innovation, management needs to be 
prepared for this outcome, should it happen. 
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